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Pro-Gun Property Regulation: How the State of Oklahoma
Controls the Property Rights of Employers Through
Firearm Legislation
I. Introduction
On the morning of July 8, 2003, shotgun blasts filled Lockheed Martin’s
“cavernous hilltop” aeronautic assembly plant in Meridian, Mississippi.1
Around 9:30 a.m., employee Doug Williams stormed out of a required “ethics
and sensitivity training session” and went to his pick-up truck in the plant’s
parking lot. He loaded a semi-automatic rifle and a shotgun, tied on a red
bandana, and strapped on bandoleers of extra shells before reentering the
plant.2 In what was called a “panorama of carnage,” Williams murdered five
co-workers that morning before taking his own life.3 Police investigating the
crime scene discovered more weapons and ammunition in Williams’ pickup.4
Like Mississippi, Oklahoma is no stranger to workplace violence. In 1986,
an Edmond, Oklahoma, part-time letter carrier named Patrick Henry Sherrill
“tucked two .45-caliber pistols into his postal satchel, locked the doors of a
post office in this Oklahoma City suburb and systematically killed 14 people,
then committed suicide.”5 Sherrill was “facing possible dismissal after a
troubled work history” and “thought he was being treated unfairly at work.”6
Sherrill responded by shooting “more people in a single day than all but one
other gunman in U.S. history up to that point.”7
Shootings in the workplace are a recognized hazard in work places
throughout Oklahoma and the United States. In San Diego, California, on
March 25, 2009, bus mechanic Lonnie Glasco finished his shift just after 2
a.m., walked into the company break room, and shouted “nobody’s going to
leave!” before raising his handgun and killing two co-workers.8 In Manning,
South Carolina, on May 10, 2009, an employee at the Waffle House was
1. David M. Halbfinger & Ariel Hart, Man Kills 5 Co-workers at Plant and Himself, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2003, at A1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Kevin Johnson, 6 Dead in Miss. Factory Shooting, USA TODAY, July 9, 2003, at A01.
5. Tim Talley, Survivors Recall Terror of Postal Massacre, DESERET NEWS, Aug. 19,
2006, at A02.
6. Ken Raymond, Edmond Post Office Massacre 20 Years Later, THE OKLAHOMAN,
August 13, 2006, at 1A.
7. Id.
8. Elliot Spagat, Third Death from Shooting at San Diego Bus Depot, VENTURA COUNTY
STAR, March 25, 2009, http://www.vcstar.com/news/2009/mar/25/third-death-from-shooting-atsan-diego-bus-02/.
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charged with assault and battery with intent to kill after an argument with a
customer over the quality of the restaurant’s food led to the shooting of that
customer by the employee.9 The complaining customer threw a waffle at
employee Yakeisha Ward. She responded by going to her van in the parking
lot and grabbing her gun.10 She reentered the restaurant and shot the customer
in the arm.11
Given the frequency of incidents like these, it was understandable, if not
laudable, that many Oklahoma employers enacted gun-free parking lot policies
at their workplaces. In response to these gun-free policies, the Oklahoma
legislature amended existing firearms laws to outlaw any workplace policy that
prohibited employees from keeping guns in their cars while parked on
workplace property. Several Oklahoma companies that maintained gun-free
parking lot policies filed suit, requesting a permanent injunction against
enforcement of this legislation on grounds that it was an unconstitutional
violation of the Due Process Clause, the Takings Clause, and the Supremacy
Clause. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry
held that the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) does not preempt
amendments (“The Amendments”) to a pair of Oklahoma firearm laws that
criminalize company policies which prohibit employees from storing firearms
in their car during work.12 This decision reversed the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Oklahoma’s decision to grant a permanent injunction
against the enforcement of the Amendments in ConocoPhillips v. Henry.13
This is a case of federalism in the parking lot. The judicial interpretations
that stand in the aftermath of this Tenth Circuit collision between federal
occupational laws and state of Oklahoma gun laws have a profound effect on
the property rights of Oklahoma employers. The traditional notions of
property law regard the right to exclude certain persons from entering property
as the most essential right “in the bundle of rights we call property.”14 The
decision in Ramsey excises important aspects of the right to exclude:
specifically, the right of employers to regulate the presence of firearms on their
property. The plaintiffs involved in this series of challenges asserted three
primary legal theories to support the claim that the Amendments violate their
Constitutional property rights. First, the Amendments amount to a violation
of the Takings Clause. Second, the Amendments interfere with the
9. Police: SC Waffle House Waitress Shoots Customer After Complaint, WSBTV.COM,
May 13, 2009, http://www.wsbtv.com/news/19447180/detail.html.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009).
13. ConocoPhillips v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Okla. 2007).
14. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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fundamental right to exclude, thereby violating substantive due process rights.
Third, the Amendments violate the Supremacy Clause and are preempted by
OSHA.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in determining that the
Amendments do not violate the Supremacy Clause. This determination has a
significant and adverse impact on the property rights of Oklahoma employers.
Under the doctrine of obstacle conflict preemption, the Amendments impede
compliance with OSHA’s general duty clause and accomplishment of OSHA’s
overall purpose. Therefore, OSHA should preempt the Amendments, and
Oklahoma employers should recover their right to exclude people with
firearms from their property. This note also critiques the court’s Takings
Clause and substantive due process analysis. Part II discusses pre-Ramsey law
over Oklahoma gun-at-work statutes. Parts III and IV discuss Ramsey and
analyze the court’s decision through a property lens. Part V offers a more
sound legal approach to dealing with these pro-gun statutes than used by the
court in Ramsey. This note concludes in Part VI.
Any legislative act that divests property owners of the ability to control the
presence of firearms on their own property strikes a blow to the common sense
understanding of property rights. The decision in Ramsey amounts to judicial
approval of the State of Oklahoma’s regulatory arm, wearing a pro-gun glove,
reaching into and altering the realm of private property rights. While the Court
of Appeal’s decision could be labeled a victory for both states’ rights and gun
rights advocates, the logic and reasoning supporting the case remain
vulnerable to criticism. The legal treatment of the Amendments prior to the
Ramsey decision represents an approach to this issue that produced a wellreasoned constitutional review of the Oklahoma gun laws.
II. The Law Before Ramsey
A. Brief Overview of the Three Constitutional Issues Implicated by the
Ramsey Decision
The Ramsey case implicated three Constitutional issues. The employerplaintiffs claimed that the Amendments amount to a regulatory taking under
the Fifth Amendment, a substantive due process violation under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and a Supremacy Clause violation under Article VI, Clause II.
1. Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause reads, “ nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.”15 Justice Holmes noted
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that certain government regulations may
be disguised as police power but are in reality de facto takings of private
property.16 This is the essence of a regulatory taking. The Supreme Court has
subsequently stated that in “70-odd years of succeeding ‘regulatory takings
jurisprudence,’ we have generally eschewed ‘any set formula’ for determining
how far is too far, preferring to ‘engag[e] in . . . essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries.’”17
The Takings Clause does not limit the scope of government power. It only
requires “just compensation” for the property being “taken.”18 In other words,
the “Takings Clause does not prohibit the taking of private property but
instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.”19 The purpose of the
clause “is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property
rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise
proper interference amounting to a taking.”20 Success on a takings claim
would not merit an injunction of the Amendments. It would only merit
compensation for the “taking.”
The analytical framework provided by the Supreme Court in Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. is used to determine if legislation amounts to a regulatory
taking. Under this framework the court must determine if the regulation fits
into one of two categories: a per se regulatory taking, or a Penn Central
regulatory taking.
There are two types of per se takings under the Lingle framework. First, a
Loretto taking occurs when property owners experience a “permanent physical
occupation” of their property.21 Second, a Lucas taking occurs when the
regulation completely deprives an owner of “all economically beneficial or
productive uses” of the property.22 If the regulation is not a per se taking, the
16. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of
Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, N.C. L. REV. 713, 713 (2002) (citing Pa. Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
17. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (quoting Penn. Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005).
20. Id. at 537.
21. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (holding
that a New York Law requiring certain property owners to allow the installation and
maintenance of cable television lines on their property amounted to a regulatory taking because
although the property invasion was minor, the cable installations represented a permanent
physical occupation of the plaintiff’s property.).
22. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (holding that the South
Carolina Beachfront Management Act, which prohibited the plaintiff/landowner from erecting
any permanent habitable structures on two of his parcels of land, was a violation of the Fifth
Amendment because the regulation deprived the plaintiff of all economically beneficial uses
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court engages in the ad hoc balancing test set forth in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York to determine if a taking has occurred.
In Penn Central, the plaintiffs were the owners of New York City’s Grand
Central Station Terminal, which was subject to New York’s Landmark
Preservation Law.23 The plaintiffs wanted to construct a 50-story office
building over the terminal. The New York City Landmarks Preservation
Commission refused to approve plaintiff’s proposal.24 The plaintiffs sued,
alleging “the Landmarks Law has deprived them of any gainful use of their
‘air rights’ above the Terminal and that, irrespective of the value of the
remainder of their parcel, the city has ‘taken’ their right to this super-adjacent
airspace, thus entitling them to ‘just compensation’ measured by the fair
market value of these air rights.”25 To analyze the plaintiffs’ takings claim, the
Supreme Court considered “the character of the government intrusion; the
degree of interference with reasonable, investment-backed expectations of the
property owner; and the economic impact of the action.”26 The Court rejected
the plaintiffs’ claim, holding that “the restrictions imposed are substantially
related to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable
beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities
further to enhance not only the Terminal site proper but also other
properties.”27
While these different approaches each focus on different aspects of a
particular regulation, each is a tool for the court to measure the “severity of the
burden that the government imposes on private property rights” to determine
if an unconstitutional taking has occurred.28
2. Interference with Property Rights and the Substantive Due Process
Clause
While the Takings Clause prohibits expropriations of private property
without just compensation, all owners of property have unique rights that are
protected from improper state action by the due process components of the
Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments.29 The Fifth Amendment mandates that
“[N]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without the due
of his property.).
23. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 104 (1978).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 130.
26. ConocoPhillips v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1313 (N.D. Okla. 2007).
27. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138.
28. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
29. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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process of law.”30 Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment reads, “nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . ”31 Article II, Section VII of the Oklahoma Constitution, which “has
a definitional sweep that is coextensive with its federal counterpart,”32 states
that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . ”33
The hallmark of constitutionally protected property interests is the right to
exclude others.34 As stated by Justice Brandeis, “[a]n essential element of
individual property is the legal right to exclude others . . . ”35 Indeed, the right
to exclude certain individuals from property is perhaps the most fundamental
of all property rights. Property rights are often conceptualized as a bundle of
sticks, with each stick representing a distinct right enjoyed by property owners.
The Supreme Court has referred to the right to exclude as “one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property.”36
Under the doctrine of substantive due process,37 certain rights are
considered so fundamental under the Constitution that any regulation that
restricts such a right shall be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.38 To satisfy this
level of review, the state must show that the Amendments are necessary and
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, and that the state’s
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
32. Gladstone v. Bartlesville Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 30 (I-30), 2003 OK 30, nn.15-16, 66
P.3d 442, 442 nn.15-16.
33. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 7.
34. College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 667
(1999).
35. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (dissenting opinion).
36. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979).
37. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). The Court explained that
the “established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, we
have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights
and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,’ and
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed.’ Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a ‘careful
description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. Our Nation's history, legal traditions,
and practices thus provide the crucial ‘guideposts for responsible decision making,’ that direct
and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause. As we stated recently in Flores, the
Fourteenth Amendment ‘forbids the government to infringe . . . ‘fundamental’ liberty interests
at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land,
106 MICH. L. REV. 1479 (2008) (explaining the evolution of the Court’s substantive due process
jurisprudence, and the problems associated with the two tier Glucksberg approach).
38. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003).
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objectives could not be served be less restrictive measures.39 If the particular
right is determined to be non-fundamental, regulations curtailing the exercise
of that right are only subject to rational basis review.40 Rational basis review
requires only that the Amendments be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest.41
3. The Doctrine of Preemption and the Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause42 is the Constitutional foundation that supports the
doctrine of preemption. When a federal law conflicts with a state law, the
Supremacy Clause, through the doctrine of preemption, operates to displace
the state law and exalt the federal law to a position of supremacy.43
Congressional intent is the principal subject of discussion during a preemption
analysis.44 The court must examine and define the federal legislation’s
purpose and objectives to engage in the necessary comparative analysis to
determine if the state actually conflicts with the federal law.45 Within the
doctrine of preemption, there are three categories of inquiry: express
preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption.46 The unique
federalism clash in Ramsey triggers a conflict preemption inquiry.
The category of conflict preemption is further divided into impossibility
preemption and obstacle preemption. The court in Choate v. Champion Home
Builders described the essence of conflict preemption by stating, “the Court
has found [conflict] pre-emption where it is impossible for a private party to
comply with both state and federal requirements, or where the state law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and
objectives of Congress.”47 For impossibility preemption to be applicable to
39. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
40. See Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that if the law
does not implicate a fundamental right, heightened scrutiny is inappropriate, and the law is only
subject to rational basis review by the court.).
41. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
42. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
43. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1816); Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1982).
44. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299 (1988).
45. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992).
46. Choate v. Champion Home Builders, 222 F.3d 788, 792-97 (10th Cir. 2000). The court
explained that “express preemption” operates when a federal law explicitly states that it
preempts a state law, and explaining that “field preemption,” also called “implied preemption,”
operates when a federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive that it occupies an entire field of law,
and state legislation is passed within that field. Id. In these instances, courts will infer an intent
to preempt the state law if the federal law is considered pervasive enough to occupy an entire
field of law, hence the term “implied” preemption. Id.
47. Id. (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)).
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Ramsey, OSHA would have to expressly require employers to maintain no
firearm policies in order for compliance under OSHA. Because “OSHA has
not taken th[is] final step,” impossibility conflict preemption is not directly
applicable to Ramsey.48
Obstacle conflict preemption, however, is applicable to this particular
federalism conflict. Obstacle preemption operates when a state law materially
“impede[s] some policy or purpose of a federal statue or regulation.”49 In
Ramsey, the federal regulation is the general duty clause of OSHA, and the
obstacle is the Oklahoma Firearm Amendments. The determination as to what
is a sufficient obstacle “is a matter of judgment, to be informed by examining
the federal statues as a whole and indentifying its purpose and intended
effects.”50
B. OSHA and the General Duty Clause
The purpose of OSHA is to facilitate “safe and healthful working conditions
and to preserve our human resources . . . ” in order to “stimulate employers
and employees to institute new and to perfect existing programs for providing
safe and healthful working conditions.”51 The general duty clause of OSHA
is embodied at 29 U.S.C. § 654a(1) and states that each employer “shall
furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to his employees.”52 This clause is referred to
as the general duty clause because it “asks employers to protect employees
from all kinds of serious hazards, regardless of the source.”53 Congress
intended this clause to cover unanticipated hazards.54 Accordingly, Congress
enacted the general duty clause to cover serious hazards that were not
otherwise covered by specific regulations.55 Courts have determined that the
general duty clause extends to the prevention of harm caused by other
employees.56
48. ConocoPhillips v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1329 (N.D. Okla. 2007).
49. Mgmt. Ass’n for Private Photogrammetric Surveyors v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 2d
596, 603 (E.D. Va. 2006); Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass’n v. Salt Lake City, 164 F.3d 480, 489
(10th Cir. 1998).
50. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1) (2009).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (2009).
53. United States v. Pitt-Des Moines, Inc., 168 F.3d 976, 982 (7th Cir. 1999).
54. Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799, 803 (6th Cir. 1984).
55. S. Ohio Building Systems, Inc. v. OSHRC, 649 F.2d 456, 458 (6 Cir. 1981).
56. See Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1975). The
court explained that under OSHA “an employer is responsible if it knew or, with the exercise
of reasonable diligence, should have known of the existence of a serious violation. A particular
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OSHA Standard Interpretations Letter 1900 provides guidance on analyzing
the relationship between the general duty clause and an employer’s duty to
abate the risk of gun-related workplace violence.57 In this letter, Director of
Enforcement for OSHA, Richard E. Fairfax stated that while OSHA does not
contain an express ban on guns in the American workplace, OSHA does
regulate the risks related to workplace gun violence through the general duty
clause.58 The letter indicated that in situations where the risk of gun-related
workplace violence rises to the level of a recognized hazard, the general duty
clause “would require an employer to take feasible steps to minimize those
risks,” and any “failure of an employer to implement feasible means of
abatement of these hazards could result in the finding of an OSH Act
violation . . . ” under the general duty clause.59 A workplace hazard becomes
“recognized” when the hazard is acknowledged by either the industry in which
the employer operates, as a whole, or recognized independently by the
employer.60
In Megawest Financial, Inc., the Secretary of Labor cited the owner of “The
Villas,” an apartment complex in a crime stricken area of Ft. Lauderdale,
Florida, under the general duty clause for failing to implement security
measures to protect employees from violent attacks by tenants.61 On appeal,
an administrative law judge reversed the citation, holding that the risk of
violence to the apartment workers did not rise to the level of a “recognized
hazard” because the risk of violence was not recognized by the apartment
management industry as a whole, or by actual employer.62 This decision
shows that the general duty clause does extend to all situations where
workplace violence is a threat;63 however, it also shows that determining when
a particular workplace hazard is in fact a “recognized hazard” under the

instance of ‘hazardous employee conduct may be considered preventable even if no employer
could have detected the conduct, or its hazardous nature, at the moment of its occurrence, . . .
[where] such conduct might have been precluded through feasible precautions concerning the
hiring, training, and sanctioning of employees.’”
57. OSHA Standard Interpretation Letter 1900, 2006 WL 4093048 (Dep’t of Labor Sept.
13, 2006).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Megawest Fin., Inc., 1995 OSAHRC Lexis 80 (Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm’n May 8, 1995).
61. Id.
62. Id. at *24.
63. ConocoPhillips v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1330 (N.D. Okla. 2007). The court
noted that “although it was not ultimately upheld by the ALJ, the Secretary of Labor issued the
citation. This reveals that the general duty clause extends to injuries inflicted upon employees
with weapons during a violent incident on company property.”
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general duty clause is done on a case-by-case basis.64
C. The Battle Over Guns in the Parking Lot
The controversy underlying Ramsey began when several Oklahoma
employees were fired for violating their employer’s gun-free parking lot
policy.65
In 2003, these employees obtained counsel and argued
unsuccessfully that the Oklahoma law permitting employers to implement such
policies was in violation the Oklahoma Constitution.66 While the plaintiffs
were unsuccessful in their claim, their attorney was not satisfied with the
outcome. He sounded the battle cry over guns in the parking lot, and the
Oklahoma legislature listened.
1. The Impetus: Bastible v. Weyerhauser Co.
The underlying conflict reflected in Ramsey began with the 2003 case of
Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser Co.67 The plaintiffs were the employees of the
defendant at a paper mill in Valliant, Oklahoma.68 The defendant employer
maintained a policy that “prohibit[ed] bringing onto Company property,
including Company-owned or leased parking areas, any firearms, whether
properly licensed or not.”69 The plaintiffs, terminated for violating this policy,
sued to challenge the “Business Owners Rights” portion of the Oklahoma Self
Defense Act, which expressly permitted such employer policies. The section
provided that “nothing contained in any provision of the [Act] . . . shall be
construed to limit, restrict or prohibit in any manner the existing rights of any
person, property owner, tenant, employer, or business entity to control the
possession of weapons on any property owned or controlled by the person or
business entity.”70
The plaintiffs claimed that the statute violated Article II of the Oklahoma
Constitution, which secured Oklahomans’ right to carry firearms in certain
situations.71 The court disagreed, ruling the plaintiffs’ state constitutional
64. See Megawest Fin., Inc., 1995 OSAHRC Lexis 80 at *29 (explaining that, “a high
standard of proof must be met to show that the employer itself recognized the hazard of
workplace violence.”).
65. ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.
66. Id. at 1291, n.15.
67. Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 437 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 2006).
68. Id. at 1001.
69. Id. at 1001 n.1.
70. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1290.1 (2002) (amended 2004).
71. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26 (“The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of
his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereunto legally summoned,
shall never be prohibited; but nothing herein contained shall prevent the Legislature from
regulating the carrying of weapons.”).
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rights were not violated because Oklahomans do not enjoy an “absolute
common-law or constitutional right to carry loaded weapons at all times and
in all circumstances.”72 Additionally, the court remonstrated that Article II of
the Oklahoma Constitution provides: “nothing herein contained shall prevent
the Legislature from regulating the carrying of weapons.”73 The court
concluded that because Oklahoma employees do not enjoy an “unfettered right
to transport and use firearms,” the statute did not violate the Oklahoma state
Constitution.74
2. The Amendments
Lawrence A.G. Johnson was the attorney for the plaintiffs in Bastible.75 His
experience impelled him to author legislative amendments (the Amendments)
that revised the Oklahoma Firearm Act (OFA) and the Oklahoma Self Defense
Act (OSDA) to impose criminal sanctions on any employer that maintained a
gun-free parking lot policy.76 Johnson commented that the Amendments were
inspired in response to the “continuous problem [that] arises relative to the
conflict [that] law-abiding gun owners have regarding the exercise of their
right to transport firearms to and from work and park in the employer’s
parking lot.”77 The Amendments were adopted by the Oklahoma legislature
and became effective on March 31, 2004.78 The revised “Business Owner’s
Rights” section of the OSDA read, “no person, property owner, tenant,
employer, or business entity shall be permitted to establish any policy or rule
that has the effect of prohibiting any person, except a convicted felon, from
transporting and storing firearms in a locked vehicle on any property set aside
for any vehicle.”79
3. ConocoPhillips v. Henry
Within a year, several Oklahoma businesses took to the courts, seeking to
enjoin enforcement of the Amendments.80 Whirlpool Corporation filed the
initial complaint seeking an injunction against enforcement on October 27,

72. Bastible, 437 F.3d at 1006 (citing State ex. rel. Okla. State Bureau of Investigation v.
Warren, 1998 OK 133, ¶ 13, 975 P.2d 900, 902).
73. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 26.
74. Bastible, 437 F.3d at 1006.
75. ConocoPhillips v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1291, n.15 (N.D. Okla. 2007).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1291.
78. Id.
79. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1289.7a (Supp. 2004); 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1290.22(B) (Supp. 2004)
.
80. See ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.
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2004.81 On November 22, 2004, Whirlpool and defendants filed a stipulation
of dismissal of Whirlpool, and ConocoPhillips stepped in as the sole plaintiff.82
As ConocoPhillips v. Henry was pending, Governor Brad Henry signed
another amendment to the OFA, on June 9, 2005.83 This amendment provided:
No person, property owner, tenant, employer, or business entity
shall maintain, establish, or enforce any policy or rule that has the
effect of prohibiting any person, except a convicted felon, from
transporting and storing firearms in a locked motor vehicle, or from
transporting and storing firearms locked in or locked to a motor
vehicle on any property set aside for any motor vehicle.84
The ConocoPhillips court considered both the 2004 and 2005 Amendments
when assessing whether to grant a permanent injunction against enforcement
of the Amendments.85
By the time ConocoPhillips v. Henry came before the court, Alaska,
Kansas, Minnesota, and Kentucky had passed laws similar to the Oklahoma
Amendments.86 Thirteen other states had rejected such laws.87 However,
Judge Kern’s opinion in ConocoPhillips noted that his court was “the first to
address the constitutionality of these types of laws.”88 The plaintiffs
indentified three constitutional bases for their request for permanent
declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of the Amendments.89
First, the plaintiffs alleged that the Amendments violated the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause because they amount to a regulatory taking of
private property.90 Second, the Amendments interfered with the fundamental
property right to exclude and violated the Substantive Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the right to exclude is a fundamental
right, the plaintiffs argued the Amendments should be subject to strict
scrutiny.91 Third, the Amendments implicated the Supremacy Clause of the
81. Id. at 1287 n.7.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1289; 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1289.7a.
84. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1289.7a.
85. ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1290.
86. David Harper, Employers Can Forbid Guns, a Judge Rules, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 6,
2007, at A-4.
87. Id.
88. ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
89. Id. at 1295 (indicating that the plaintiffs alleged that the Amendments are
unconstitutionally vague, however the court determined that the plaintiffs lack standing for a
vagueness challenge).
90. Id.
91. Id.
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U.S. Constitution and were preempted by various federal statutes, including:
OSHA, the Federal Gun Free School Zone Act, and the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act.92
The court did not accept the plaintiff’s claim that the Amendments
amounted to a regulatory taking of private property by the state of Oklahoma.93
The Fourteenth Amendment, which makes the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause applicable to the states, mandates that no person shall be deprived of
private property taken for public use without just compensation.94 A
regulatory taking can occur if the government enacts a regulation that is “so
onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation.”95
The ConocoPhillips court followed the analytical framework provided by
the Supreme Court in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., and determined that the
Amendments did not amount to a regulatory taking.96 The court did not
conduct a Lucas economic taking analysis because that type of taking requires
a deprivation of economic or productive benefit, and the plaintiffs did not
allege in their complaints that they had ever suffered any such deprivation.97
The court then conducted a Loretto physical taking analysis and determined
that the “permanent physical invasion” required was not present.98 For a
physical occupation to occur, there must an actual physical taking or forced
easement upon the property owner.99
The court distinguished physical invasions from physical occupations, and
noted that these “physical invasions fall outside the Loretto rule.”100 The court
held that even though “the right to exclude (most fundamental of all property
interests) is impaired, the Court cannot conclude that the amendments qualify
for per se treatment. Instead, the invasion is more akin to the temporary
physical invasion cases that courts have analyzed under the Penn Central
balancing analysis.”101
Under the Penn Central analysis, the court analyzed the character of the
governmental intrusion and the economic harm/interference with investment92. Id. at 1301-02 n.28. Halliburton filed an amicus brief arguing that the Amendments are
preempted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Safe Explosive Act. However, “courts
generally refuse to consider issues as to the interpretation or constitutionality of a statutory
provision unless such issues are also raised by, or joined in by, a party to the action.” Id.
93. Id. at 1317.
94. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005).
95. Id. at 537.
96. Id. at 528.
97. ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1307-08.
98. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982).
99. ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1308-09.
100. Id. at 1308.
101. Id. at 1311-12.
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backed expectations.102 However, the court commented that because “the
Supreme Court has never sanctioned a finding of a Penn Central taking in the
absence of allegations of economic harm . . . ” the Takings Clause claim must
fail.103
The court also adopted a very narrow view of private property rights and
rejected the plaintiff’s substantive due process claim.104 The court refused to
recognize the right to exclude people with firearms from one’s property, and
held that the Amendments did not amount to an unconstitutional deprivation
of a fundamental right.105 The plaintiffs offered case law arising under the
Takings Clause “that labels the right to exclude as one of the most treasured
strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”106 But, the court noted that
the Supreme Court has “long eschewed heightened scrutiny when addressing
substantive due process challenges to government regulation [of property
rights].”107 Consequently, the court held that “the right to exclude cannot be
considered a ‘fundamental right’ under a substantive due process analysis, and
the Amendments are not subject to heightened scrutiny.”108 The court
concluded that the appropriate standard of constitutional review was rational
basis.109
The court did, however, accept the plaintiff’s supremacy clause argument.110
The court determined that only the Occupational Safety and Health Act and
the Brady Bill were applicable, because the plaintiffs did not have standing to
sue under the other stated federal laws.111 This standing determination was
made because relief from the court would not redress their injury.112 The court
did not reach a Brady Bill preemption analysis because it determined that
OSHA directly clashed with the Amendments and therefore preempted the
102. Id. at 1312.
103. Id. at 1317.
104. See id. at 1322.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1318.
107. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005).
108. See generally Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep’t, 453 F.3d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir. 2006);
United States v. 16.92 Acres of Land, 670 F.2d 1369, 1373 (7th Cir. 1982); Coal. for Equal
Rights, Inc. v. Owens, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1263 (D. Colo. 2006).
109. Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1580 (10th Cir. 1995).
110. ConocoPhillips v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1339 (N.D. Okla. 2007).
111. Id. at 1303.
112. Id. Plaintiffs argued the Amendments are preempted by 39 C.F.R. § 232.1, which
prohibits possession of a firearm on any postal property. Because the plaintiff’s did not own
or operate a postal facility, any successful preemption claim based on this law would be
inapplicable to them. In other words, even if this claim were successful, it would not allow
plaintiff’s to maintain their policies free from the criminal prosecution provided by the
Amendments. Therefore, plaintiffs did not have standing under this law.
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state laws.113 The ConocoPhillips court concluded that the Amendments were
preempted because of an “obstacle” conflict with OSHA.114 The court
determined that this was a situation “in which state law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of
Congress.”115 Specifically, the court held that “the Oklahoma Legislature’s
attempt to disallow employers from choosing to abate the hazards of gunrelated workplace violence and unauthorized firearms on company property
must be enjoined because the Amendments stand as an obstacle to complying
with the general duty clause and accomplishing OSHA’s purpose.”116
The permanent injunction granted by the ConocoPhillips court was
appealed by the state. The result of this appeal is the principal case of this
note, Ramsey Winch Inc., v. Henry.
III. Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry
A. Procedural History
After the Amendments were enjoined in ConocoPhillips, Oklahoma
Governor Brad Henry and Attorney General Drew Edmondson appealed to the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. They claimed that OSHA should be
“interpreted in a manner that prevents the interference with states’ exercise of
police power to protect their citizens.”117 Governor Henry and Attorney
General Edmondson urged that the state and federal laws could coexist without
implicating the Supremacy Clause because “OSHA rules do not stand for the
proposition that law-abiding citizens cannot carry their guns.”118
Ramsey Winch Inc. and several other businesses joined ConocoPhillips as
plaintiffs for the appeal.
B. Issues
The court of appeals in Ramsey addressed the same three issues as the
ConocoPhillips court. First, whether the district court correctly held that the
Amendments were preempted by the general duty clause of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act. More specifically, does OSHA’s general duty clause
cover gun-related violence? Second, whether the lower court correctly held
that the Amendments did not constitute an unconstitutional regulatory taking
113. Id. at 1304 n.32.
114. Id. at 1330.
115. Choate v. Champion Home Builders, 222 F.3d 788, 792 (10th Cir. 2000).
116. ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1329 n.56.
117. Roger Boczkiewicz, AG, Governor Seek Reversal on Gun Ruling, TULSA WORLD, Jan.
26, 2008, at A1-A4.
118. Id. at A4.
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under the Fifth Amendment. Third, whether the district court correctly
determined that the Amendments did not violate a substantive due process
right under the Fourteenth Amendment by infringing on employer’s right to
exclude people with firearms from their property.
C. Holding
The district court in ConocoPhillips concluded that the Amendments were
preempted by the general duty clause of OSHA under the doctrine of obstacle
conflict preemption.119 The court rejected the plaintiff’s Takings Clause and
Substantive due process claim. The court in ConocoPhillips recognized that
gun-related workplace violence is a recognized workplace hazard and is
therefore subject to federal regulation under OSHA.120 Because the
Amendments “materially impede the ability to comply” with OSHA and
“thwart [the] federal objective of promoting workplace safety,” the Supremacy
Clause requires the Amendments to be permanently enjoined.121
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court’s permanent
injunction, finding no Supremacy Clause violation. The court found no
preemption by OSHA, no Takings Clause violation, and no substantive due
process violation.
IV. The Tenth Circuit’s Reasoning in Ramsey
A. Takings Clause Claim
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals flatly rejected the Takings Clause
violation claim. The plaintiffs argued that that the Amendments amounted to
a per se taking in the form of a “land-use exaction” because they require
plaintiffs to provide an easement for people carrying firearms.122 In the
alternative, the plaintiffs argued that the Amendments were a taking under
Penn Central because of their economic impact and high degree of
interference with legitimate property interests.
The plaintiff’s per se takings claim, that the Amendments represented an
unconstitutional land use exaction on their property, did not persuade the
Tenth Circuit. The court refused to expand per se regulations beyond the
physical taking realm and into an analysis regarding a non-physical taking.
The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that under Penn Central the
Amendments were a taking because the presence of firearms on employer
119.
120.
121.
122.

See ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1339-40.
Id. at 1330.
Id. at 1334.
Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1209 (10th Cir. 2009).
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property would inevitably increase costs associated with workplace
violence.123 Aside from the general claim that guns at work inevitably increase
costs associated with workplace violence, the plaintiff’s offered no specific
details regarding the economic impact they suffered due to the Amendments.124
B. Substantive Due Process Claim
The Ramsey court refused to recognize the right to exclude as a fundamental
right and subjected the Amendments to rational basis review. The court
commented: “We need not decide the long-running debate as to whether
allowing individuals to carry firearms enhances or diminishes the overall
safety of the community. The very fact that this question is so hotly debated,
however, is evidence enough that a rational basis exists for the
amendments.”125
C. Supremacy Clause Claim
When undertaking an obstacle preemption inquiry, the court must determine
if the state law impedes the policy or purpose of a federal statute or
regulation.126 To do this under the facts of Ramsey, the court looked to the
legislative objectives and policies offered by Congress when they created
OSHA for guidance.127 The principle task before the Ramsey court involved
interpreting the general duty clause of OSHA.
The court held that gun-related workplace violence was not a “recognized
hazard” by employing a very narrow view of the hazards covered by OSHA’s
general duty clause.128 The court refused to accept the argument that the
general duty clause should be extended to recognize random gun violence.129
The court determined that because there was no Congressional intent for
OSHA to target gun-related workplace violence130 there was no conflict, and

123. Id. at 1210.
124. Id. (“The only economic impact cited by Plaintiffs is the general claim (located in a
footnote of their brief) that allowing firearms onto an employer’s property inevitably increases
costs linked to workplace violence. A constitutional taking requires more than an incidental
increase in potential costs for employers as a result of a new regulation.”).
125. Id. at 1211.
126. See Mgmt. Ass’n for Private Photogrammetric Surveyors v. United States, 467 F. Supp.
2d 596, 603 (E.D. Va. 2006); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000);
Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass’n v. Salt Lake City, 164 F.3d 480, 489 (10th Cir. 1998).
127. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987).
128. Ramsey Winch Inc., 555 F.3d at 1206. The court seems to rely on a view that Congress
intended only to cover “traditional work related hazards.” See id. at 1205.
129. Id. at 1206.
130. Id. at 1208.
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OSHA must yield to state police powers.131 This narrow interpretation of
OSHA by the court has a dramatic effect on the property rights of Oklahoma
business owners.
V. Critique of the Reasoning in Ramsey
The reasoning behind the Ramsey decision is subject to critique from both
a doctrinal and a policy perspective. While the logic driving the court’s
Takings Clause and Substantive Due Process Clause analyses has deficiencies,
the most flagrant misapplication of constitutional law appears in the court’s
preemption analysis.
From a policy standpoint, the Ramsey decision is an improper reversal of
a sound district court opinion. The lower court recognized the threat posed by
workplace violence and interpreted the general duty clause accordingly. The
American Bar Association reported that “roughly one thousand people are
killed at work each year, and guns are used in nearly eighty percent of those
deaths.”132 The ABA went on record in 2007 supporting the right of
employers “to exclude from the workplace and other private property persons
in possession of firearms or other weapons.”133 The Ramsey decision cuts
against sound workplace policy.
Much of the Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding Takings Clause claims
reflects a strained attempt to conceptually “disentangle” the concepts of a
Takings Clause violation and a substantive due process, “right to exclude,”
violation.134 Critics have claimed that the Court’s expansion of the Takings
Clause reflects a willingness to use the clause as a “catchall guarantor of
property interest.”135 This note clarifies the proper boundary of the Takings
Clause in regulatory takings claims and analyzes the substantive due process
implications of the Amendments in a separate framework.
A. Takings Clause Claim
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that under Penn Central the
Amendments amount to a taking because the presence of firearms on employer
property would inevitably increase costs associated with workplace
violence.136 This determination is questionable. Under the Penn Central

131. Id.
132. David Harper, Employers Can Forbid Guns, a Judge Rules, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 6,
2007, at A4.
133. Id.
134. Krotoszynski, supra note 16, at 714.
135. Id. at 715.
136. Ramsey Winch Inc., 555 F.3d at 1210.
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analysis, the court gauges “the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact
and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests.”137
Success under this inquiry requires that the Amendments create “more than an
incidental increase in potential costs for employers as a result of a new
regulation.”138
The Amendments are not a regulatory taking of property per se because the
Amendments do not amount to a physical invasion of the plaintiffs’ property,
nor do they take all economic value or productive capacity from the plaintiffs’
property. The Amendments do, however, function as a restriction that is
“functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly
appropriates private property . . . ”139
However, the Ramsey court found that the plaintiffs failed to allege any
quantified economic losses as a result of the Amendments.140 The plaintiffs’
attorneys should have offered a more detailed description of the economic
costs associate with the Amendments, instead of simply alleging in a footnote
of their brief that “it is beyond reasonable dispute that if the injunction against
enforcement of the Amendments is dissolved, it would inevitably cause
financial harm to the Appellees.”141 The footnote concluded, “ultimately, the
Amendments would unquestionably impose financial burdens on Appellees,
and it cannot be argued to the contrary. It is however difficult to quantify
those burdens . . . ”142 This suspicious and conclusory claim did not slip past
the Tenth Circuit; apparently the issue was well within the realm of
“reasonable dispute.” The court noted the insufficiency in this portion of the
plaintiffs’ takings claim by first noting, “the only economic impact cited by
Plaintiffs is the general claim (located in a footnote of their brief) that allowing
firearms onto an employer’s property inevitably increases costs linked to
workplace violence.”143 The court continued, “[p]laintiffs do not assert any
interference with their investment backed expectations, and therefore, ‘have
failed to demonstrate that the right to exclude others’ is so essential to the use
or economic value of their property that the state-authorized limitation of it
amount[s] to a taking.’”144

137. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
138. Ramsey Winch Inc., 555 F.3d at 1210.
139. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
140. Ramsey Winch Inc., 555 F.3d at 1210.
141. Plaintiffs’/Appellees’ Brief in Response to Defendants’/Appellants’ Opening Brief at
n.31, ConocoPhillips v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (No. 07-5166).
142. Id.
143. Ramsey Winch Inc., 555 F.3d at 1210.
144. Id. (citing Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980)).
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The court’s analysis failed “to capture the actual economic value” of the
costs forced upon Oklahoma employers and their investment backed
expectations.145 Because of these costs, employers cannot make full
productive use of their property. The costs related to workplace violence
include “lost work time and wages, reduced productivity, medical costs,
workers' compensation payments, and legal and security expenses . . . ” that
“clearly run into many billions of dollars.”146 The Ramsey court failed to
consider employer litigation costs (negligent hiring, supervision, training,
retention), increases in insurance premiums, and increased security costs all
linked to workplace violence. The court also failed to consider the loss of
productivity. The National Safe Workplace Institute calculates that the
average cost to employers of a single episode of workplace violence can
amount to $250,000 in lost work time and legal expenses.147 While the
plaintiffs in Ramsey failed to allege in detail the negative economic impact of
Amendments in their Takings Clause claim, these costs associated with
workplace violence are substantial and inhibit employers’ ability to make full
economic use of their property.
B. Substantive Due Process Claim
Property owners should possess consistent property rights. These property
rights should be considered fundamental rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment and its substantive due process component. The court found a
certain degree of merit in the substantive due process challenge but rejected
the claim in the end.148
Real property rights “have always been fundamental to and part of the
preservation of liberty and personal freedom in the United States.”149
Additionally, the right to exclude certain people from property is “the most
fundamental of all property interest.”150 Under the widely used Glucksberg v.
145. Babbit v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 239 (1997). The Supreme Court in Babbit heard a
Takings Clause claim that involved a provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act that
operated to deprive property owners of their right to pass on their land by devise or by intestacy.
The court’s discussion of a “right of an individual to direct the descent of his property” rings
of substantive due process; however, the “extraordinary character” of the governmental
regulation shocked the court and significantly impacted the takings analysis. The court noted
regulations like this amount “to a virtual abrogation” of a particular of property interest, and are
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment.
146. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WORKPLACE VIOLENCE: ISSUES IN RESPONSE (2004).
147. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENCE AND THEFT IN THE WORKPLACE (1994).
148. Ramsey Winch Inc., 555 F.3d at 1210.
149. David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others from Private
Property: A Fundamental Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 39 (2000).
150. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
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Washington two-step approach to determine if a right is fundamental,151 Chief
Justice Rehnquist “divided the inquiry into two discrete steps: first one defines
the right carefully, and second one asks whether the right, so defined, is
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”152 Under “the
Glucksberg Two-Step, a right must be carefully defined before a court can
decide whether it is deeply rooted.”153 How a particular right is defined is
often the essential factor determinative of the outcome of the case.154
In Ramsey, the right at play should have been defined as the right of
property owners to exclude firearms from their property. Accordingly, under
step two of the Glucksberg analysis, because the right to exclude is the sine
qua non of property rights in the United States,155 regulations like the
Amendments violate the doctrine of substantive due process by restricting a
fundamental right and should be subject to strict scrutiny. Regulations that
restrict fundamental rights are unconstitutional when the law fails to serve a
compelling state interest or where the law is not narrowly tailored to advance
a compelling state interest.156
The Amendments could not survive strict scrutiny review. Under this level
of analysis the State of Oklahoma must demonstrate that the Amendments are
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that the State’s objective
could not be achieved by any less restrictive measures.157 The legislative goals
of the Amendments, as defined by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
in Whirlpool v. Henry, are to promote the public health, safety and welfare of
Oklahomans, deter crime, and protect the community as a whole.158 The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals also noted that the Amendments
“concern protection of the community as a whole rather than individual
citizens.”159

151. Barnett, supra note 37, at 1495 (“And lower courts, like the Ninth Circuit in Raich,
largely continue to employ the Glucksberg Two Step. . .”).
152. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)).
153. Id. at 1489.
154. Id. at 1489-90 (comparing the plaintiff’s definition and the Court’s definition of the
particular right at play in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (2005). The plaintiff, Angel Raich,
claimed that the Controlled Dangerous Substance Act restricted her right to preserve her life,
because it restricted her ability to use medical cannabis. However, the Court characterized the
right as the right to obtain and use marijuana.)
155. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. R EV . 730, 730
(1998).
156. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
157. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
158. Whirlpool v. Henry, 2005 OK CR 7, ¶ 8, 110 P.3d 83, 86.
159. Id.
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The Amendments do not serve their stated legislative goals because they are
not at all tailored to achieve their goal of promoting public safety. There is
little or no evidence that a regulation that facilitates the presence of guns in the
workplace promotes the public health, safety and welfare of Oklahomans,
deters crime, or protects the community as a whole. In fact, the Amendments
actually directly operate against the stated legislative goals of the
Amendments. The district court in ConocoPhillips commented, “the
Amendments would likely not survive any degree of heightened scrutiny.
They force property owners to allow potentially dangerous weapons on their
private property in order to increase public safety and deter crime.”160 The
lower court concluded that “as a matter of common sense, and as argued by
Plaintiffs, an increased number of firearms in vehicles on private property
would logically lead to an overall decrease in public safety.”161 Additionally,
Tulsa Police Chief David Been noted that the “presence of firearms in a locked
vehicle on an employer’s parking lot increases the risk of workplace
violence . . . The Amendments will pose a higher likelihood of the use of
firearms, and a corresponding greater risk of violence from them.”162 Because
of this massive disconnect between the Amendments’ actual effect and their
legislative goals, the Amendments would fail strict scrutiny.
Moreover, the Amendments are overinclusive in their attempt to serve the
goal of the legislation, even assuming arguendo that increasing the potential
for guns in the workplace does in fact promote public safety. The
Amendments’ broad application would extend to places like daycare centers,
mental health clinics, state and federal courthouses, and battered women’s
shelters.163 Unreasonable examples such as these reveal both the over
inclusive nature of the Amendments, and their lack of a rational nexus to any
legislative goal concerning public safety.
The Amendments survive, however, under the court’s rational basis
analysis.164 According to the Tenth Circuit’s rational basis review, a statute
that enables employee to bring firearms to workplace parking lots promotes
the general welfare of society and deters crime. Although the level of scrutiny
is not heightened, there should be a baseline level of review, even under this
notoriously lax standard. It strains the bounds of acceptable public policy to
conclude that a regulation eliminating an employer’s ability to exclude
firearms from their property protects the public welfare, maintains good order,
160. ConocoPhillips v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1321 (N.D. Okla. 2007).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1337.
163. Plaintiffs’/Appellees’ Brief in Response to Defendants’/Appellants’ Opening Brief,
supra note 141, at 41.
164. Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1211 (10th Cir. 2009).
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promotes safety or preserves morals.165 Under rational basis review, however,
“if a regulation is fairly debatable, then legislative judgment must control.”166
While the standard of rationality is very deferential, it still requires that
there be a rational connection between the legislation and the aims of the
legislature.167 It is irrational to conclude that substantially increasing the
likelihood of guns related violence in the workplace promotes the public safety
of Oklahoma employers and property owners. The principle behind states’
police power is “the control and regulation of private interests for the public
good.”168 Commentators have argued, “the mere invocation of public safety
must not serve as a shibboleth that precludes any meaningful judicial inquiry
into the real intent and effect of the regulation at issue.”169 The classification
of the right to exclude as a non-fundamental right removes the ability of the
courts to rationally assess the Amendments, because any meaningful rational
basis review is clouded by the constant partisan gun rights debate. This is
evident in Ramsey when the court stated, “We need not decide the long
running debate as to whether allowing individuals to carry firearms enhances
or diminishes the overall safety of the community. The very fact that this
question is so hotly debated, however, is evidence enough that a rational basis
exists for the Amendments.”170
In the aftermath of this decision, it is clear that if courts continue to
consider the right to exclude to be outside the protection of the due process
clause, then the legislature’s collective public policy determination wins the
day. On the other hand, if courts accept the notion that the plaintiffs’ right to
exclude is worthy of heightened judicial protection, both traditional notions of
property ownership and workplace safety are served.
C. Supremacy Clause Claim
The Amendments must give way to OSHA because “the state law
impermissibly ‘conflicts’ with the general duty clause and the accomplishment
of the express congressional purpose set forth in the OSH Act.”171 This
particular conflict in federalism is an excellent illustration of state legislation
that violates the Supremacy Clause through the doctrine of obstacle
preemption. Even without a specific standard addressing gun-related work
place violence, OSHA requires employers to “abate the hazard of gun-related
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Bittle v. Bahe, 2008 OK 10, n.15, 192 P.3d 810, 823 n.15.
See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
Crider v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Boulder, 246 F.3d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir. 2001).
Bittle, n.15, 192 P.3d at 823 n.15.
Krotoszynski, supra note 16, at 718.
Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1209 (10th Cir. 2009).
ConocoPhillips v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1339 (N.D. Okla. 2007).
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workplace violence and comply with the general duty clause to the best of its
ability.”172
The court in Ramsey incorrectly applied OSHA Standard Interpretations
Letter 1900 to determine that Congress did not intend for the general duty
clause to cover gun-related work place violence.173 This letter does not contain
an express statement that workplace violence is not covered by the general
duty clause, but the court reads the following text to reach that conclusion.
The letter notes that:
While generally deferring to other federal, state, and local lawenforcement agencies to regulate workplace homicides, OSHA did
develop an enforcement policy with regard to workplace violence
as early as 1992 in a letter of interpretation that stated: In a
workplace where the risk of violence and serious personal injury
are significant enough to be “recognized hazards,” the general duty
clause [specified by Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSH Act)] would require the employer to take feasible
steps to minimize those risks. Failure of an employer to implement
feasible means of abatement of these hazards could result in the
finding of an OSH Act violation.174
The Ramsey court ignored the emphasis of the 1992 letter, and determined
that declining to expressly proffer a standard on workplace gun violence
foreclosed the general duty clause from extending to workplace violence. The
letter clarified that employers may be cited for a general duty violation in a
“workplace where the risk of violence and serious personal injury are
significant enough to be ‘recognized hazards.’” The lower court correctly read
the clause with the understanding that OSHA was intended by Congress to
cover unanticipated hazards.175
On January 16, 2009, about a month before the court decided Ramsey,
OSHA Assisting Secretary Thomas Stohler authored a “statement of agency
position” letter regarding the meaning of the general duty clause.176 This letter
was sent to Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Clerk Elisabeth Shumaker days
before the Ramsey decision.177 Stohler wrote, “since no OSHA standard
172. Id.
173. OSHA Standard Interpretation Letter 1900, 2006 WL 4093048 (Dep’t of Labor Sept.
13, 2006).
174. Id.
175. Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799, 803 (6th Cir. 1984).
176. Letter from Thomas Stohler, Acting Assistant Sec'y of Labor, to Jerry Ellis, Oklahoma
State Senate (Jan. 16, 2009).
177. Id.
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specifically governs the issue of the presence of firearms in vehicles in
company parking lots, states generally retain broad authority regarding
individual rights under the Second Amendment.”178 The letter continued,
“[The Amendments] do not on their face pose a conflict with the general duty
clause or purpose of the OSH Act. Gun-related violence is not a recognized
occupational hazard in industry as a whole, under normal working
conditions.”179 Therefore, “state law protecting an employees right to transport
and store firearms in a locked car on employer premises would not on their
face impede the employer’s ability to comply with the general duty clause.”180
The general duty clause is an essential key to the success of the overall goal
of OSHA, which is the abatement of dangers in the workplace. It allows
employers to craft policies, such as gun-free parking lot policies, that are
aimed at preventing hazards that are recognized in that particular workplace.
When the threat of violence at a workplace rises to the level of “recognized
hazard,” as recognized by the industry or independently by the employers like
the plaintiffs,181 the general duty clause requires employers to take feasible
steps to decrease that hazard in the form of polices such as these. The general
duty clause breathes life into these policies. This approach ensures for
effectiveness of hazard reduction for an employers unique occupational
environment.
In order for an employer to be cited for a violation of the general duty
clause, the Secretary of Labor must determine if the danger satisfies a three
part test: “(1) a hazard likely to cause death or serious bodily harm existed at
a citable workplace; (2) th[e] hazard was recognized as such be the cited
employer or generally within the industry; and (3) there was a feasible method
by which the cited employer could have abated the recognized hazard.”182
Companies with gun-free parking lot policies are implementing a “feasible
method” of abatement of the recognized gun violence hazard in order to avoid
OSHA citation under the general duty clause.
Under the general duty clause, there need be no “specific OSH standard”
regarding an activity in order for that activity to fall within the sweep of the
general duty clause. The contention that OSHA must contain a specific
standard on gun-related workplace violence for the general duty clause to
apply appears to be a claim that flows from an impossibility preemption
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Megawest Fin., Inc., 1995 OSAHRC Lexis 80, *24 (Occupational Safety and Health
Review Comm’n May 8, 1995).
182. Bariod Div. of NL Ind., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 660
F.2d 439, 444 (10th Cir. 1981).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011

106

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:81

analysis, and this is not the correct framework of analysis for Ramsey. If
OSHA provided a specific standard against guns in the parking lot,
impossibility preemption would come into play. Under impossibility
preemption, the federal law preempts only if “it is impossible for a private
party to comply with both state and federal requirements.”183 If OSHA offered
a specific standard including gun-related violence in the meaning of
“recognized hazard,” then it would be impossible for Oklahomans to comply
with both the federal general duty clause and the state Amendments. On the
other hand, because there is no specific standard regarding gun violence, as
determined by the Tenth Circuit and Assisting Secretary Stohler, there is no
potential for impossibility preemption. But, Assisting Secretary Stohler’s
letter and the Ramsey court’s reasoning do not fully address the issue of
obstacle preemption.
Under obstacle preemption the federal law preempts “where the state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose
and objectives of Congress.”184 Under this analysis, there need not be an
express OSHA standard addressing guns in parking lots for there to be an
“obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and
objectives . . . ” of the general duty clause.185 If gun-related violence is
considered a “recognized hazard” under the general duty clause, then under the
doctrine of obstacle preemption, the Oklahoma firearm amendments are
undoubtedly an obstacle to employer compliance with the OSHA’s general
duty clause.
The court in Ramsey relied heavily on Megawest Financial Inc. to define
the general duty clause in relation to violence in the workplace.186 The facts
of Megawest are distinguishable from the facts of Ramsey because the risk of
violence in Megawest was from non-employee tenants.187 This is an important
distinction. The Oklahoma firearm Amendments allow both employees and
non-employees to bring guns to work, and this creates a direct OSHA
conflict — a situation where state legislation empowers employees to engage
in an activity that decreases workplace safety below federal standards. In
Ramsey, the employees themselves generate the risk of violence while at their
place of work; therefore the general duty clause is on point.
The administrative law judge in Megawest held that the “hazard of physical
assault . . . arises not from the process or materials of the workplace, but from
183. Choate v. Champion Home Builders, 222 F.3d 788, 792 (10th Cir. 2000).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Megawest Fin., Inc., 1995 OSAHRC Lexis 80 (Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm’n May 8, 1995).
187. Id. at *2.
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the anger and frustration of people.” It does not matter from where the hazard
arises because that is not the concern of OSHA. The Act is associated with
hazards that are present in the workplace. Presence, not origin of the hazard
is of importance. In fact, it is called the general duty clause because it “asks
employers to protect employees from all kinds of serious hazards, regardless
of the source.”188
Employers do not have the ability to accurately predict and prepare for each
instance of workplace violence, but this does not mean workplace violence is
not recognized as a hazard under the general duty clause. The claim that gunrelated violence is not a recognized hazard in the workplace belies reality.
From 1997 to 2007, "there were more than 7,000 occupational homicides
nationwide . . . ” according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.189
Additionally, 2008 was a record setting year for workplace suicides with
251.190 This is a 28% increase from 2007.191 Economic recession also “fuels
worries of workplace violence.”192 The “fears of violence fueled by financial
worries [grow] as [a] recession puts strain and stress on anxious workers.”193
These financial stresses coupled with accessible firearms in the parking lot
create a potentially dangerous situation.
The court’s unsound conclusion regarding this issue is the central flaw of
this decision. The court narrowly confined the general duty clause’s
recognized hazards to the types of hazards that Congress clearly “had in
mind.”194 This approach guts the purpose of the general duty clause; courts
should define “recognized hazards” as hazards that the employer or the
employer’s industry have in mind. The American business landscape is too
diverse for Congress to determine what risks are recognized — and what risks
are not — with regard to every workplace in the nation. The general duty
clause circumvents this problem and protects American workers by allowing
the actual employer’s particular knowledge of risks to determine if a particular
hazard is recognized. Under the Ramsey court’s approach, the general duty
clause is stripped of this essential feature.

188. United States v. Pitt-Des Moines, Inc., 168 F.3d 976, 982 (7th Cir. 1999).
189. Ellen Wulfhorst, Recession Fuels Worries of Workplace Violence, FORBES, April 22,
2009, http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/04/22/afx6320908.html.
190. Catherine Rampell, More on Workplace Suicides, N.Y. TIMES, August 31, 2009,
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/31/more-on-workplace-suicides/.
191. Id.
192. Wulfhorst, supra note 189.
193. Id.
194. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444, 449
(1984).
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The Tenth Circuit disregarded the plain meaning of the words in the text of
the clause. The clear and manifest purpose of the general duty clause is
apparent from the text of the clause itself: “to furnish . . . a place of
employment which [is] free from recognized hazards that are causing or are
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.”195 If OSHA
were required to set forth precise standards for each particular workplace
danger before it could fall under the general duty clause, the clause would lose
the ability to regulate those dangerous but unaccounted for hazards that exist
in the workplace.
D. The Bullet Loophole
The decision in Ramsey represents an erosion of employer property rights.
There is a potential “bullet loophole” left by the Amendments, however, which
allows employers to promote a gun-free workplace despite the Tenth Circuit’s
approval of the Amendments.
While the Amendments require that the guns stored be unloaded, the text
of the law would not be applicable to an employer policy that banned the
presence of bullets, rather than guns, in the cars of employees. This policy
would be in accord with the statute, maintain the deterrent effect of firearms,
and provide employers with a tool to keep their business free from firearm
violence. This could be called the “bullet loophole.” The statute requires the
guns to be “open and unloaded,” so a policy such as this would be in direct
conformity with the statute.196
An employer policy exploiting this loophole might read,
“To be in accordance with OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1289.1 et seq.
(The “Oklahoma Firearms Act ”) and OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 1290.1
et seq. (The “Oklahoma Self-Defense Act”), this company’s
firearm policy permits employees to keep unloaded firearms in
their car while at work, pursuant to these statues. Additionally, to
satisfy the “unloaded” requirement of the statutes, all bullets,
shells, cartridges, or ammunition are prohibited from company
property. Any employee found to possess ammunition while on
company premises will be in direct violation of company policy
and may be terminated.”
This provision would give Oklahoma employers the ability to control gun
violence on their property through an alternate method. This method is
certainly not as effective as directly prohibiting firearms, but it comports with
195. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (2009).
196. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1289.7 (Supp. 2005).
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the Amendments. Most importantly, removing bullets from the scenario
renders firearms impotent.
VI. Conclusion
According to a 2005 study by the American Journal of Public Health,
“workplaces where guns were specifically permitted were 5 to 7 times more
likely to be the site of a worker homicide relative to those where all weapons
were prohibited.”197 The plaintiffs in the Ramsey line of cases all recognized
the correlation between the presence of firearms near the workplace and
homicides at the workplace. They enacted workplace policies in light of this
knowledge. The Amendments shot these policies down.
Through its Substantive Due Process Clause and Takings Clause analyses,
the Ramsey court limited the property rights enjoyed by Oklahoma employers.
These clarifications have a significant impact on the workplace environment
of many Oklahoma businesses. Additionally, the court’s preemption analysis
indicated that gun-related violence is not within the realm of workplace
hazards covered by OSHA’s general duty clause.
The District Court in ConocoPhillips resolved this Supremacy Clause
dispute with sound Constitutional theory and reasonable statutory
interpretation. Oklahoma employers should have the ability to control the
presence of firearms on the totality of their property. The decision in Ramsey
makes this impossible. Congress crafted OSHA and the Act’s general duty
clause with the intent of providing employees a workplace free of recognized
hazards. Gun-related workplace violence is a recognized hazard that is
covered by the general duty clause. The Amendments operate as a major
obstacle for the plaintiffs in their attempts to comply with OSHA’s objectives
and goals. This obstacle takes “the form of a criminal sanction, rendering it
impossible for Plaintiffs to utilize their chosen method of reducing workplace
hazards associated with firearms.”198
News reports are filled with accounts of workplace violence. Shootings in
the workplace are an “all too common event,” and this type of legislation
makes a gun “available in the parking lot for any employee who may be
unstable and who reaches a snapping point.”199 Because gun-related
workplace violence is a recognized hazard by many employers in the
American workplace, the Amendments stand as a significant obstacle to
compliance with the general duty clause of OSHA. This substantial
197. Dana Loomis, Stephen W. Marshall & Myduc L. Ta, Employer Policies Toward Guns
and the Risk of Homicide in the Workplace, 95 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 830, 831 (2005).
198. ConocoPhillips v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1339 (N.D. Okla. 2007).
199. David Harper, Employers Can Forbid Guns, a Judge Rules, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 6,
2007, at A4.
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“frustration of the federal purpose” merits permanent injunction against
enforcement of the Amendments.200
J. Blake Patton

200. ConocoPhillips, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.
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